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JURISDICTIONS IN WHICH ALLOCUTION IS GOVERNED BY STATUTE
Twenty-one jurisdictions and the American Law Institute have at-
tempted to dispose of allocution and its connected problems by statutory
enactment. In thirteen states the statutes are very similar, all of them
being copied or modeled after the California provisions. The American
Law Institute's proposed statute is a composite of all the statutory enact-
ments on the subject and the slight variations in the various state statutes
in this group are set forth in the commentaries to its proposed CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.122 California had a statute on the subject as early
as 1850.123 Its present provisions are from the PENAL CODE Of 1872124 as
it was amended in 1880.25 They are set forth in the PENAL CODE OF CALI-
FORNIA (1937) under the heading The Judgment, preceded by the chap-
ters on Bills of Exception, New Trials, and Arrest of Judgment. The
chapter of the Code dealing with The Judgment goes into great detail
and covers practically every conceivable matter that could arise at that
period in the proceedings from prescribing the time the judgment is to be
pronounced to probation and parole.
As to allocution the CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE provides as follows: 1 20
"Arraignment For Sentence ... When the defendant appears
for judgment he must be informed by the court, or by the clerk,
under its direction, of the nature of the charge against him and
of his plea, and the verdict, if any thereon, and nust be asked
whether he has any legal cause to show why judgment should -ot
be pronounced against him." (italics added)
The Code then proceeds to set forth the causes that may then be shown
against judgment: 27
tThe first installment of this article appeared in 9 Mo. L. REv. 115 (April
1944).
*Commissioner, Supreme Court of Missouri. A. B. Drury College 1924; J D.
University of Chicago 1927.
122. A. L. I. CODE OF CR. P;oc. (1930) 1094-1096.
123. Ex Parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 620 (1867).
124. CAL. PENAL CODE (1872) §§ 1200-1204.
125. Amendments to Code, Pt. III (1880) 26.
126. CAL. PENAL CODE (1939) § 1200.
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"He may show for cause against the judgment: 1. That he
is insane; and if, in the opinion of the court, there is reasonable
ground for believing him insane, the question of insanity must
be tried as provided in chapter six....
"2. That he has good cause to offer, either in arrest of judg-
ment or for a new trial; in which case the court may, in its dis-
cretion, order the judgment to be deferred, and proceed to decide
upon the motion in arrest of judgment or for a new trial."
Copies of the motions contemplated by the preceding Section must be
served on the state's attorney 28 and the motion must relate to the matters
set forth in the statute as "any appeal from an order entered upon a
motion other than as herein provided" would be dismissed by the court.
"If no sufficient cause is alleged or appears to the court at the time fixed
for pronouncing judgment . . . it must thereupon be rendered; and if not
rendered or pronounced within the time so fixed . . . the defendant shall
be entitled to a new trial.""129
These or substantially identical statutes have been enacted in Idaho,"' °
Iowa 1 31 Montana, 32 Nevada, 3 3 New York, 34 North Dakota,135 Okla-
homa, 1 3 South Dakota,"37 Texas,'1 8 and Utah."39 There is some differ-
ence in the Texas statutes in that in addition to insanity the defendant
may plead a pardon and when one has been arrested as a fugitive after
having been convicted he may deny that he is the person convicted.
Except for its omission of the plea of pardon Arizona's allocution
statute" is almost identical with the American Law Institute's CODE OF
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE.' 4' In this connection it should be noted that these
two codes contain a Section which provides that if the court has not com-
plied with the preceding Section and informed the defendant of the accusa-
tion and inquired whether he has any cause to show why sentence should
128. CAL. PENAL CODE (1939) § 1201.5.
129. CAL. PENAL CODE (1939) § 1202.
130. 1 IDAHO CODE ANN. (1932) §§ 19-2410, 19-2411, 19-2412.
131. IOWA CODE (1939) §§ 13955, 13956, 13957, 13958, 13958.2.
132. 5 MoNT. REV. CODES (1935) §§ 12064, 12065, 12066.
133. 5 NEv. Comp. L. (1929) §§ 11049, 11050, 11051.
134. N. Y. CR. CODE (Gilbert, 1920) §§ 480, 481, 482 N. Y. CODE CR. PROC.,
2-3 Laws N. Y. (1881) 117-118.
135. COMp. L. N. D. (1913) §§ 10933, 10934, 10935.
136. OKLA. STAT. (1931) §§ 3134-3136.
137. 2 S. D. CODE (1939) §§ 34.3703, 34.3704.
138. TEx. STAT. (Vernon, 1936) art. 773 CODE OF CR. PROC.
139. UTAH REv. STAT. (1933) §§ 105-36-9, 105-36-10, 105-36-11.
140. 3 AIz. CODE ANN. (1935) §§ 44-2216, 44-2217.
141. A. L. I. CODE OF CR.-PROC. (1930) §§ 389, 390, 391, 396.
1941] ALLOCUTION
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 3 [1944], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol9/iss3/2
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
not be pronounced ". . . the court shall set aside the sentence. . . ." and
comply with the provisions of the Code.142 The causes which may be alleged
against sentence and which are then to be determined in the manner pro-
vided by specific provisions oii the subjects are: ". . . (a) That he has
become insane since the verdict was rendered. (b) That he has been par-
doned for the offense for which he is about to be sentenced. (c) That he
is not the person against whom the verdict or judgment was rendered.
(d) If the defendant is a woman, and the sentence of death is to be pro-
nounced, that she is pregnant.'1 43 After the procedure for determining
these matters has been followed and are not proved or one of these grounds
is not alleged, sentence is pronounced. 144 In addition, after this procedure,
when the court has a discretion as to the penalty to be inflicted the court
may inquire into the aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
Arkansas and Kentucky require that the defendant be informed of the
nature of the indictment, his plea, the verdict and that he be asked ". . . if
he has any legal cause to. show why judgment should not be pronounced
against him. . . ." before he is sentenced. "He may show for cause against
the judgment any sufficient ground for new trial, or for arrest qf judg-
ment .. ." or that he has become insane. 45
Indiana, 4' Kansas,1 47 Nebraska,' 4 Ohio,140 Washington'50 and Wyom-
ing151 have similar allocution statutes. These statutes either say "When
the defendant appears for judgment . . ." or "Before the sentence is pro-
nounced . . ." the defendant must be informed by the court of the verdict
or finding and asked ". . . whether he has any legal cause to show . . ." or
"... . whether he has anything to say ... ." why judgment should not be
"pronounced" or "passed" upon him. "If no sufficient cause be alleged or
appear . . ." or "If the defendant have nothing to say, or if he show no
good and sufficient cause . . ." judgment is thereupon rendered and the
court proceeds to pronounce judgment as provided by law. The statutes
142. Id. at § 390.
143. Id. at § 391.
144. Id. at § 396.
145. ARK. DIG. STAT. (1 Pope, 1937) §§ 4075, 4076, 4077; see Ky. CR. CODE
(Carroll, 1877) §§ 286, 287.
146. IND. STAT. ANN. (4 Bums, 1942) §§ 9-2205, 9-2206.
147. GEN. STAT. KANS. (1935) §§ 62-1510, 62-1511 (source of prior law, TERR.
L. (1858), c. 12, ART. XII, § 6.
148. CoMP. STAT. NEB. (1929) §§ 29-2201, 29-2202.
149. OHIO CODE ANN. (1940) §§ 13451-1, 13454-4.
150. WASH. CODE (Pierce, 1933) § 9309.
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in this group of states do not set forth the specific causes or grounds the
defendant may allege against the pronouncement of judgment, and the
Washington statute has only the one Section which merely requires the
allocutory query.
In all the states with statutes, the ones setting forth the causes which
may be shown, as well as the ones which do not, allocution is mandatory
and there must be a substantial compliance with the statutes in felony
convictions.1 52 The purpose of requiring the ceremony is to give the de-
fendant an opportunity to sh6w the specific causes set forth in the statute,
".. . if it be a fact . . ." and to accord ". . . the defendant a final oppor-
tunity to defer or defeat the final sentence of the law."'15 3 If cause is
shown by the defendant, the record should show what it was and what
disposition the court made of it.'
A proceeding in observance of the statute is illustrated by a California
case.m4 a The defendant was convicted of murder. His motions for new
trial and in arrest of judgment were overruled and when he was arraigned
for judgment it was suggested that he was insane. The court ordered a
trial of his sanity, he was found to be sane and the death penalty was then
assessed. The defendant must specify the cause and furnish evidence of the
fact, and if he does not he cannot be injured by its omission."55 If the
record erroneously recites that the question was put when in fact it had
not been, the record may be corrected on motion and the cause will then
be remanded for resentence.156 So also the trial court may correct the
error of its omission even in the absence of the American Law Institute's
specific authority to do so,157 and the judge's recital of the nature of the
crime charged is sufficiently explicit to comply with the command of the
152. Lee v. State, 27 Ariz. 52, 229 Pac. 939 (1924); People v. Walker, 132
Cal. 137, 64 Pac. 133 (1901); Porter v. State, 17 Ind. 415 (1861); State v. Jen-
nings, 24 Kans. 460 (1881); People v. Nesce, 201 N. Y. 111, 94 N. E. 655 (1911);
Silsby v. White, 119 Ohio St 314, 164 N. E. 232 (1928); Bohannan v. State,
14 Tex. App. 271 (1883).
153. Lee v. State, 27 Ariz. 52, 67, 229 Pac. 939, 944 (1901) cited supra note
152; State v. Terry, 98 Kans. 796, 161 Pac. 905 (1916); People v. Nesce, 201 N. Y.
111, 94 N. E. 655 (1911) cited supra note 152.
154. Ex Parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 620 (1867).
154a. People v. Lawson, 178 Cal. 722, 174 Pac. 885 (1918).
155. People v. Swift, 140 Cal. App. 7, 34 P.(2d) 1041 (1934).
156. People v. Walker, 132 Cal., 137, 64 Pac. 133 (1901) cited supra note 152.
This is a leading case in California and the states adopting its statute.
157. People v. Murback, 64 Cal. 369, 30 Pac. 608 (1883); Keffer v. State,
12 Wyo. 49, 73 Pac. 556 (1903).
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statute.5" If an appellant does not seek to correct the record its recital
of allocution is conclusive. 1 The statutes do not require the record to show
allocution and it is therefore presumed from a silent record.10 In these
states the mere omission of the formality does not make the judgment void
and is not a ground or reason for a new trial, but the cause is remanded
for a compliance with the statutes and a resentencing. 161 It is also a right
the defendant may waive, as was the case when the defendant withdrew
his plea of not guilty after the trial began and entered a plea of guilty
and the court then asked her ". . . if she desired to waive delay and receive
immediate sentence. . . ." and both she and her counsel assented. Such
circumstances were held to be a waiver of the right to allocution.102 How-
ever, it was held in Wyoming that when allocution is required, the duty
is on the court (meaning the judge) to perform the ceremony and no one
else is authorized under the statute to do S0.103
These statutes do not by their terms apply to felonies only, and yet
Iowa,1614 Kansas, 65 and New York 6" have held allocution unnecessary in
misdemeanor convictions. The statute, on the other hand, was scrupu-
lously followed in a misdemeanor case by the trial court in Montana.6 "
Neither do these statutes make an exception as to the requirement
when there is a plea of guilty, but in Ohio' 6" the procedure was deemed
unnecessary in such instances. In California there had been a plea of guilty
to arson and on a hearing for probation the statute requiring allocution
was then substantially complied with, and so when the case was continued
and sentence subsequently imposed without allocution at that time it was
158. People v. Jung Qung Sing, 70 Cal. 469, 11 Pac. 755 (1886).
159. People v. Moriarity, 61 Cal. App. 223, 214 Pac. 485 (1923).
160. Nahas v. State, 199 Ind. 117, 155 N. E. 259 (1926); State v. Wood, 17
Iowa 18 (1864); State v. Wells, 46 Iowa 662 (1877); State v. Terry, 98 Kans. 796,
161 Pac. 905 (1916); Taylor v. State, 86 Neb. 795, 126 N. W. 752 (1910); Bond
v. State, 23 Ohio St. 349 (1872); Bartlett v. State, 28 Ohio St. 669 (1876);
Crowell v. State, 6 Okla. Cr. 148, 117 Pac. 883 (1911); Johnson v. State, 14 Tex.
App. 306 (1883).
161. Ex Parte Gibson, 31 Cal. 619 (1867); People v. Walker, 132 Cal. 137, 64
Pac. 133 (1901) cited supra note 152; Evers v. State, 84 Neb. 708, 121 N. W. 1005
(1909); People v. Nesce, 201 N. Y. 111, 94 N. E. 655 (1911) cited supra note 152;
Rhea v .U. S., 6 Okla. 249, 50 Pac. 992 (1897) and cases supra note 152, 160.
162. Hill v. State, 9 Okla. Cr. 629, 644, 132 Pac. 950, 956 (1913).
163. White v. State, 23 Wyo. 130, 147 Pac. 171 (1914).
164. State v. Stiefle, 13 Iowa 603 (1862).
165. State v. Lund, 51 Kan. 1, 32 Pac. 657 (1893).
166.- People v. Kaminsky, 208 N. Y. 389, 102 N. E. 515 (1913).
167. State v. Sorenson, 75 Mont. 30, 241 Pac. 616 (1925).
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held that none of the defendant's substantial rights had been violated.'6,
In Idaho a sentence of life imprisonment on a plea of guilty was set aside
for several reasons, no one of which was in and of itself a sufficient reason
for doing so, but it was noted by way of criticism that the trial court had
summarily disposed of allocution °7O On the other hand, in Oklahoma, a
man plead guilty to rape and was sentenced to fifty years' imprisonment.
He was not represented by counsel at any time during the proceedings.
He appeared before a committing magistrate on July 9, 1925, waived pre-
liminary hearing, was bound over and sentenced on the same day. He was
not given a copy of the information nor advised of his rights and claimed
to have been misled and coerced into pursuing the course he did. The
court in setting aside the judgment noted the various statutory rights, in-
cluding allocution, which had been violated and held that it was necessary
to observe the statutes unless they had been waived. 171
The Indiana statutes do not specify the causes a defendant may urge
against the pronouncement of sentence but the court has held that the
purpose of the statutory requirement was to permit the defendant to
".. . move in arrest of judgment, for want of sufficient certainty in the
indictment as to person, time, place or offense. . . ." and that if his objec-
tions were valid the whole proceeding was to be set aside. 72 As a corollary,
if the defendant's motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment have
been heard, he has spoken whether inquired of or not, and allocution is
not then necessaryY7
The most original and interesting allocution questions have been urged
in the Supreme Court of Nebraska. As indicated, the Nebraska statute
requires only that the defendant be informed of the jury's verdict and
inquired of whether he has anything to say why sentence should not be
passed against him. If he has nothing to say or if he show no good or
sufficient cause the court proceeds to pronounce judgment.14 The statute
is mandatory but compliance with it is presumed from a silent record .'7
In the first case presented, 76 1876, the statute had not been observed and
169. People v. Brahm, 98 Cal. App. 733, 277 Pac. 896 (1929).
170. State v. Poglianich, 43 Idaho 409, 252 Pac. 177 (1927).
171. Brown v. State, 39 Okla. Cr. 406, 266 Pac. 476 (1928).
172. State v. Wilson, 50 Ind. 487, 489-90 (1875).
173. McCorkle v. State, 14 Ind. 39 (1859); Ayers v State, 88 Ind. 275 (1882);
Lillard v. State, 151 Ind. 322, 50 N. E. 383 (1898).
174. See note 148 supra.
175. Taylor v. State, 86 Neb. 795, 126 N. W. 752 (1910), cited s"pra note 160.
176. Dodge v. People, 4 Neb. 220 (1876).
ALLOCUTION19441
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it was insisted that the appellate court had no authority to pass sentence
nor to remand the cause with directions merely to resentence in conform-
ity with the law and the prisoner was therefore entitled to be discharged.
The supreme court conceded that sentence might not be directly imposed
by it, but the court pointed out that it had authority to correct errors
in other respects and to review criminal proceedings to the end that a
prisoner be given a fair trial. It was noted that the English courts had
adopted the view that for errors in the sentence only the prisoner was not
discharged but the error was corrected. So while it was necessary that the
allocution statute be observed, its omission did not affect the verdict
of guilt, and the cause was remanded with directions to the trial court to
pronounce judgment on the verdict in the prescribed manner.
In 1895177 one Tracey appealed a conviction of robbery. When 'he
was arraigned for sentence, the trial court asked him how many terms he
had served in penitentiaries and he replied, "Two." On appeal it was
argued that the court had no authority to ask such a question. The supreme
court pointed out that allocution was required by the Code but held that
the district court on the occasion of allocution was not ". . . limited to the
sole question whether the person so convicted has anything to say why
judgment should not be pronounced against him." Whether the trial
court has authority to coerce an answer to any question it may propound on
that occasion the court did not decide, "... but what inquiries a court may
make of such a prisoner . . ." aside from the compulsory query, ". . is a
matter resting entirely in the discretion of the court." Correlatively what
may the prisoner respond? "He may make such statements of his previous
good behavior, of his previous good character, of his age, of his condition at
the time he committed the offense, and the.influences which were brought
to bear upon him and led to his commission of the crime as may induce
the court 'to temper justice with mercy' and to give the prisoner the least
punishment provided for by the statute."
The two McCormick cases178 present another absolutely original allo-
cution problem and one of the very rare instances of a defendant's appear-
ing in an appellate court a second time after his sentence has once been
set aside and remanded for a resentencing. McCormick was sentenced to
twenty years' imprisonment for murder. Before he was sentenced the
177. Tracey v. State, 46 Neb. 361, 366, 367, 64 N. W. 1069, 1070 (1895).
178. McCormick v. State, 66 Neb. 337, 92 N. W. 606 (1902); McCormick
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court asked him if he had anything to say why sentence should not be
passed upon him but the court neglected, as the statute requires, first to
inform the defendant of the jury's verdict. As to the whole matter of
allocution the court said, "While we may question the wisdom of such a
statute, or doubt that its requirements serve any useful purpose in criminal
procedure as conducted in the present age yet the statute remains....,,7da
is mandatory and must be observed util the legislature abrogates it. The
court not only held the allocutive query mandatory, but also held that it
was mandatory that the defendant be informed of the jury's verdict 78b
and the cause was ". . . remanded for the rendition of a valid judgment."
When McCormick was again brought before the trial court in compliance
with the mandate of his appeal, he immediatey objected that the court
had no authority to impose sentence upon him and that to do so would
violate his constitutional right against being punished twice for the same
offense. The trial court disregarded his objections and resentenced him in
accordance with the law and the mandate. On his second appeal the Su-
preme Court of Nebraska held that when the cause was remanded it then
stood in the trial court on the verdict of conviction and upon which ".... the
trial court was required by law and the order of this court to pronounce a
valid sentence and judgment."' 79 The supreme court observed that it was
not a court of general original jurisdiction but a court of review and as such
"... we have the inherent power to make such orders and such disposition
of the case as will render our judgment effective," and so when the former
sentence was set aside the matter was in the district court as though sentence
and judgment had never been pronounced.
Finally, it was decided by the Nebraska court that a defendant could not
raise the point in a habeas corpus proceeding that he had not been accorded
allocution when he was tried and sentenced, as any objection to the pro-
ceedings subsequent to his conviction could be raised by a petition in error
in which the whole record would be before the court and all errors corrected
and a proper trial awarded. 180 In Kopp v. State18" ' it was sought to raise the
point that allocution had not been accorded and was essential in a contempt
proceeding, but the record was silent and the court presumed the observance
of the statutes whether necessary or not.
178a. Id. at 66 Neb. 337, 347, 92 N. W. 606, 609 (1902) cited supra note 178.
178b. This view was again followed in Evers v. State, 84 Neb. 708, 21 N. W.
179. Id. at 71 Neb. 505, 508, 511, 99 N. W. 237, 240 (1904) cited supra note 178.
180. In re Application of Cole, 103 Neb. 802, 174 N. W. 509 (1919).
181. Kopp v. State, 124 Neb. 363, 246 N. W. 718 (1933).
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And that, it would seem, should about exhaust the possibilities of allocu-
tion either with or without a statute. But does it?
Rule 30 of the first proposed draft of the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE deals with sentence and judgment. The rule provides that sen-
tence shall be imposed, after the jury's verdict, without unreasonable delay,
but may be delayed if there is a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty, for
judgment of acquittal, in arrest of judgment, or for a new trial. There is a
provision for presentence investigation and report and the proposed rule
does not provide in express terms that the traditional allocutory query be
asked but in its stead says: "Before imposing sentence the court shall afford
the defendant the opportlnity to make a statement in his own behalf and
to present any relevant information in mitigation of punishment.1'112 As
previously noted, there has been no statute governing allocution in the
United States courts.8 3 In its notes and annotations the distinguished ad-
visory committee contrasts this provision with Section 480 of the NEw YORK
CRIMINAL CODE and Section 389 of the American Law Institute's proposed
CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE and cites Bishop, the Austin-Bagley case, and
Turner v. United States, but does not refer to the Supreme Court cases of
Ball v. United States, and Schwab v. Berggren. But is the requirement of
the proposed rules mandatory? Is it allocution? What constitutes a com-
pliance with the statute? What does not? What may or must the court say
and what is relevant on behalf of the prisoner? And finally, what are the
consequences of observing or not observing the rule? There may be no
dispute but that it is well and proper, despite the Wisconsin court's skep-
ticism, that a prisoner should be heard in mitigation of punishment and that
the proposed code provision is an excellent substitute for allocution, but it
is suggested that the matter was more happily put by the court rule from
which this one sentence was doubtless adapted: "After a plea of guilty, or
a verdict of guilt by a jury or finding of guilt by the trial court where a jury
is waived . . . (2) the condition or character of the defendant, or other
pertinent matters, should be investigated in the interest of justice before
182. This rule becomes Rule 34 in the Second Preliminary Draft of FED. RULES
OF CR. PRoC. (1944) where the language is more brief and reads as follows: "Sen-
tence shall be imposed without unreasonable delay. Pending sentence the court may
commit the defendant or alter the bail. Before imposing sentence the court shall
afford the defendant an opportunity to make a statement in his own behalf and to
present any information in mitigation of punshment."
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sentence is imposed.' 8 4 Especially is this felt to be true in view of the
Code's proposed provisions with reference to plain and harmless error here-
inafter noted.
MISSOURI AND ALLOCUTION
THE FIRST SIXTY YEARS 1820-1879
Allocution' has run the gamut of both statutes and decisions in Mis-
souri. In this jurisdiction the course of allocution's history has been so un-
usual and noteworthy that the subject is entitled to special treatment.
It was almost forty years after statehood that the first appeal involving
allocution arose and the opinion in that case became a leading authority
throughout the country for the view that the common law required allocu-
tion in cases in which there had been a capital conviction only. In State v.
Ball, the defendant had been found guilty of murder in the second degree
and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment. On his appeal it was assigned
as error that it did not appear from the record that he had been allocutively
addressed by the court before he was sentenced. The court fully considered
Blackstone, Chitty, and the old English cases and came to the conclusion
that allocution was ".... the formal address of the judge to the prisoner ask-
ing him why sentence should not be pronounced." 18 5 The court pointed out
that importance had been attached to the ceremony in England because
the reviewing court determined from the observance or non-observance of
this formality whether the prisoner had been given an opportunity to plead
a pardon or to urge any of the traditional grounds in arrest of judgment.
The court noted that a pardon would now be recognized either before or
after judgment, that attainder was no longer a consequence of a capital
conviction, and held allocution necessary in capital cases only. It was
twenty-two years before the question was raised again and that was in a
non-capital case and State v. Ball was followedi8s a
THE SEcoND SIXTY YEARS 1879-1943
Despite the fact that in over half a century there had been but two
cases involving allocution; and despite the fact that there is now no known
184. Rules of practice and procedure, after plea of guilty, verdict, or finding
of guilt in criminal cases in the United States court as promulgated by the Supreme
Court of the United States pursuant to act of congress, 47 STAT. 904 (1933), 28
U. S. C. § 723a (1940). These rules are reported in 301 U. S. 717, amending those
found in 292 U. S. 661.
185. State v. Ball, 27 Mo. 324, 326 (1858).
185a. State v. Stark, 72 Mo. 37 (1880).
1944] ALLOCUTION
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or discoverable reason for the legislature's taking the matter over from the
courts, the statute revision commission of 1879 inserted-two new Sections
into the statutes relating to criminal procedure and thereby undertook to
govern and settle the subject of allocution and its related problems. The
revision was of the GENERAL STATUTES OF 1865186 and the new sections were
inserted in the chapter entitled Of The Verdict And Judgment And The
Proceedings Thereon"'I80 which thereafter, in all subsequent revisions, pre-
cedes the articles dealing with new trials, arrest of judgment, and appeals.
The statutes adopted differ in phraseology from all other statutes on the
subject and the second Section is absolutely unique. They have remained
unchanged in text since they appeared in the revision of 1879 as Sections
1939 and 1940:187
"Sec. 1939. Prisoirer may be heard before sentence.-When the
defendant appears for judgment, he must be informed by the court
of the verdict of the jury, and asked whether he has any legal cause
to show why judgment should not be pronounced against him;
and if no such sufficient cause be shown against it, the court must
render the proper judgment.
"Sec. 1940. Preceding section, when directory.-If the defend-
ant has been heard on a motion for a new trial, or in arrest of
judgment, and in all cases of misdemeanor, the requirements of the
next preceding section shall be deemed directory, and the omission
to comply with it shall not invalidate the judgment or sentence of
the court."
Clearly, when applicable, the statute is mandatory and apparently,
plain enough. It is what is not expressly contained in the statutes that has
provoked the difficulties in Missouri. But before the problems can be fully
appreciated and the cases properly considered, it is necessary briefly to
direct attention to certain other procedural provisions of the Criminal Code.
Then (1879), and -now, the statutes set forth the procedure to be followed
from the time the jury brings in its verdict.""B The verdict must be ren-
dered in open court, if the offense is punishable by imprisonment ... for the
186. 1 Mo. REv. STAT. (1879) Preface iii.
186a. See Mo. GEN. STAT. (1865) 851-855. They were inserted between Section
11, dealing with recognizances, and Section 12 on the duty of the clerk in entering
criminal judgments on the minutes and the duty of the court in inspecting and
conforming the minutes to the facts. See Mo. REv. STAT. (1879) §§ 1936 to 1941.
187. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 4102, 4103; Mo. Rnv. STAT. (1929) §§ 3713-
3714; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) § 4057-4058; Mo. REv. STAT. (1909) §§ 5263, 5264;
Mo. REv. STAT. (1899) §§ 2658, 2659; Mo. REV. STAT. (1889) §§ 4239, 4240.
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purpose of judgment the defendant must be personally present,"' 18 9 and
when a judgment upon conviction is rendered the clerk enters the judgment
".... fully on the minutes, stating briefly the offense...." and the court in-
spects the entries and conforms them to the facts.190 The statutes specify
the five causes for which the trial court may grant a new trial' 91 and today
provide that a motion for a new trial must be in writing and "... must set
forth in detail and with particularity... the specific grounds or causes there-
for. Such motion shall be filed before judgment and within four days after
the return of the verdict," but the time may be extended for thirty days
and no longer. 92 An appeal in a criminal case is from a "...final judgment
rendered upon any indictment or information.. .,,13 and "... when any ap-
peal shall be taken ... it shall be the duty of the clerk.., to make out a full
transcript of the record in the cause including the bill of exceptions, judg-
ment and sentence and certify ... same. .. ." to the proper appellate court. 94
In the very first case decided after the enactment of the statutes, and
that was sixteen years, the court got off to a bad beginning. In a grand
larceny case 95 the court very'carefully considered 'all the questions raised
by the defendant's motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment; and
then of its own volition, and, although -no statute so specified, called atten-
tion to the fact that "it does not appear from the record," prior to sentence,
that the defendant was asked if he had anything to say why sentence should
not be passed upon him. The court referred to the common law and the
cases generally and stated that our statute made it very plain that the for-
mality of allocution "... . must occur in court.. ." and ".... before the court
proceeds to sentence the prisoner." But the court finally observed that the
succeeding Section made the requirement directory when the defendant had
been heard on motion for a new trial or in arrest of judgment, which was
the fact in the instance before the court, and therefore the judgment was
affirmed. Thus, in a case clearly within the directory provisions of the
statute and the question being in no way involved in the case before the
court, the doctrine became established that the fact of allocution must ap-
pear from the record.
189. Id. at § 4100.
190. Id. at § 4104.
191. Id. at § 4124.
192. Id. at § 4125.
193. Id. at § 4130.
194. Id. at § 4146.
195. State v. Nagel, 136 Mo. 45, 50, 51, 37 S. W. 821, 823 (1896).
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There was another lapse of sixteen years before the court again con-
sidered the problems of the statute and that time the case had its seriocomic
aspects and a rather ironic ending.08 One Kile was found guilty of seduc-
tion under promise of marriage and sentenced to two years' imprisonment.
He was sorely aggrieved by the jury's finding and thought himself entitled
to a new trial but ". . .without any objection or exception being interposed,"
the court pronounced sentence the same day the verdict was returned and
two days later his motion for a new trial was filed. The point before the
court was that contrary to the new trial statute his motion was filed after
and not before judgment and therefore the query was whether the case was
before the court on the record proper only, excluding consideration of any
matters of exception. The court so held and confined itself solely to a con-
sideration of errors appearing on the record proper, after which the court,
again of its own volition apparently, quoted the allocution statutes and said
that since he had not been heard on his motion for a new trial, its being filed
after judgment but within four days, it was the trial court's duty before
pronouncing sentence to comply with the statute, inform the prisoner of the
jury's verdict, and put the allocutory question to him. In so doing it was
observed that the right to be so heard (allocutively) had come down to us
from the common law, and "...had its origin and has become imbedded in
our laws because of the necessity of safeguarding against error and injustice
by securing to the accused, even after he has been found guilty, the right to
speak and show cause, if any he has, why judgment should not be pro-
nounced, before the final act of the law shall take from him the right of
life and liberty." The court stated that the directory Section of the statute
added emphasis to the mandatory character of the statute when the defend-
ant had not been heard on his motion for a new trial. The court remanded
the cause with specific directions that the prisoner be brought again into
court and that judgment be pronounced in accordance with the opinion.
When the cause came up the second timeosa it developed that the trial court,
instead-of observing the mandate of the supreme court, on motion of the
state's attorney, made a nztnc pro tunc entry showing the verdict, allocu-
tion, and judgment. The court then stated that if the first judgment had
not reflected the true facts it could have been corrected by a motion in
dimunition of the record, but that the trial court's nunc pro tl0Lc entry
could not affect the court's previous judgment as "Ulnder our mandate, the
196. State v. Kile, 231 Mo. 59, 61, 63, 132 S. W. 230, 231 (1910).
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trial court had but one duty to perform, namely, to call into court and re-
sentence the defendant." "As all the issues... were finally settled ... [this
left] nothing to be done except pronouncing a proper judgment." Neither
could the prisoner, the court said, by a proceeding subsequent to its former
judgment bring the first record of the trial court up for review. Since the
court's mandate had not been complied with, and astonishingly enough it
would seem, an indignant court held ". . this appeal is without warrant of
law and must be dismissed." (Italics added) And so, despite the hortatory
discussion by the court, in its first opinion, of the value and purpose of
allocution, neither the statute nor the court's mandate appear to have been
so imperative after all.197
Thereafter it became firmly established that when the motion for a new
trial had been filed out of time, after sentence and judgment, only the record
proper could be considered; and if that record failed to show allocution in
a felony conviction, the cause was remanded with directions to the trial
court to observe the mandate of the statute, grant allocution, and resentence
the prisoner2 98
The leading cases were State v. Caulder' 90 and State v. Taylor200 de-
cided in 1923. In the first case Caulder was convicted of bigamy and sen-
tenced to two years' imprisonment. His motion for a new trial was filed
three days after the verdict but it was not filed before he was sentenced;
hence, only the record proper was before the court for review, and that did
not show allocution. The court cited State v. Dunnegan, State v. Kanupa and
State v. Ball, supra, and held allocution mandatory in all felony convictions.
The majority of the court held, and this became the crux of the matter in
Missouri, that allocution would not "... be presumed where the record is
silent upon the subject and it does not otherwise properly appear that the
requirement was not complied with." Judge Walker wrote a most inter-
esting dissenting opinion in which he pointed out that in any event the
omission was not such an error as to require a reversal of the judgment and
197. This, the Potter case infra note 211 and the McCormick cases, supra
note 178, in Nebraska are the only three instances of cases involving allocution
coming before the court a second time, and in none of them was the result changed.
198. State v. Dunnegan, 258 Mo. 373, 167 S. W. 497 (1914); State v. Keller,
304 Mo. 63, 263 S. W. 171 (1924); State v. Cantrell, 263 S. W. 177 (Mo. 1924);
State v. Deck, 262 S. W. 712 (Mo. 1924); State v. Huffman, 267 S. W. 838 (Mo.
1924); State v. McSame, 267 S. W. 888 (Mo. 1924); State v. Barrett, 44 S. W.
(2d) 76 (Mo. 1931); State v. Broyles, 340 Mo. 962, 104 S. W. (2) 70 (1937).
199. 301 Mo. 276, 279, 256 S. W. 1063, 1064 (1923).
200. 301 Mo. 432, 256 S. W. 1059 (1923).
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put the query as to whether a more wholesome disposition of the case would
not be "... to entertain the presumption of regularity permissible in regard
to proceedings of courts acting within the scope of their jurisdiction, and to
have held (therefore) that the defendant was not denied the right in ques-
tion." Judge Walker thought the presumption of regularity in the trial
court's proceedings should be entertained because, in the case before the
court "... . the failure of the record to show allocution is not complained of
by the defendant."20 oa He noted, as the statute says, that one of its pur-
poses is to inform the defendant of the verdict, of which Caulder had full
knowledge, because he not only filed a motion for a new trial but also it
was in fact heard and overruled though filed out of time-that is after judg-
ment. He reviewed the history of allocution and pointed to the fact that
invariably a defendant now had counsel. He argued that by the second
Section, when a motion for a new trial was filed notice of the verdict was
shown, and the legislature in such circumstances intended the requirement
to be directory only. The most important part of his argument related to the
motion for a new trial. He said the majority view was based on the fact
that the motion for a new trial was not filed before judgment as the motion
for new trial statute requires and that that fact in and of itself prohibited
the court from considering the allocution statute as mandatory. Judge Wal-
ker emphasized that the purpose and effect of failing to comply with the
new trial statute was to limit the appellate court's revievv and had nothing
to do with allocution and whether the allocution statute was directory or
mandatory or whether compliance with its terms could be reasonably as-
sumed under the circumstances. He concluded that the majority opinion
occasioned only unnecessary delay and the useless process of sending the
case back for resentence.
The Taylor case was a larceny conviction with the motions for new
trial and in arrest of judgment filed and overruled after sentence; conse-
quently, only the record proper was before the court and it did not show
allocution. The court adhered to its ruling in the Caulder case and again
refused to indulge the presumption of regularity of the proceedings in the
trial court from a silent record. But there was present in the Taylor case
this very significant difference. "The record liere arflimatively shows that
the defendant wds not given time to file his 'motion for new trial, nor granted
allocution." (Italics added) All the proceedings occurred on the same day
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and the record ". . . recital shows a continuous sequence from the returning
of the verdict to the pronouncement of sentence." The court then said:
"In the present case the defendant, apparently, did not have any appreciable
time to prepare and file his motion. Here, then, comes in the importance of
allocution." The court continued that if allocution had been granted the
defendant could have demanded a deferment of sentence because he had
not had time to file his motion for a new trial. "A defendant convicted of a
felony is by the statute allowed four days to file his motion for new trial ...
The court must allow time for him to file said motion after the verdict and
before the pronouncement of judgment. If he is allowed allocution and fails
to ask time in which to file his motion he may be deemed to have waived
it. '200b The c6urt set the judgment aside because sufficient time in which
to file the motion for a new trial had not been given, ordered allocution and
permitted the defendant, if he desired, to appeal, using the motion already
filed to save for review all exceptions preserved in his bill of exceptions.
Judge Walker again dissented, setting forth the views he had previously ex-
pressed in the Caulder case.
So it was when a defendant was prevented or unable to file his motion
for new trial because of the illegal act of the circuit clerk and the record failed
to show allocution, the judgment was set aside "... immediately following
the verdict aforesaid, leaving the record as it stands, showing the filing of
the defendant's motion for a new trial on March 18, 1924. The court is
further directed, if said motion for a new trial is overruled, that defendant
shall be granted allocution before judgment is entered and sentence pro-
nounced; and that he be allowed to appeal from said judgment to this court
if he desires to do so. ' '201 In 1933, the whole matter was again reviewed in
State v. Turpin2o2 under a somewhat different record. There was no bill of
exceptions and consequently the case was before the court on the record
proper only. The record showed that there had been a motion for a new trial
but it was filed after sentence and judgment. The court en banc, unanimously
said the verdict was received and "... judgment and sentence were pro-
nounced all in one proceeding, without opportunity for allocution or the
filing of a motion for new trial before judgment." Citing the Dunnegan,
Caidder, Taylor, Madden and Barrett cases the court said: "In these cir-
200b. State v. Taylor, 301 Mo. 432, 438, 439, 440, 256 S. W. 1059, 1061, 1062
(1923).
201. State v. West, 270 S. W. 279, 282 (Mo., 1925).
202. 332 Mo. 1012, 1020 61 S. W. (2d) 945, 949 (1933).
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cumstances the judgment must be xeversed and the cause remanded." It was
said, comparing the Nagel, Kile and Dunnegan cases, that' formerly the
practice had been to remand the case for allocution only but since the Taylor
case the failure to accord allocution and the pronouncement of judgment
and sentence before the filing and hearing of the motion for new trial en-
titled the defendant to have the cause reversed and remanded because the
defendant's substantial right to be heard on the motion had been prej-
udiced. 20 3
Meantime State v. Madden2 °8 had added to this rule the further re-
quirement that not only was the court bound to grant allocution but also it
Was not necessary for the defendant to request that judgment be withheld
until he could file a motion for a new trial-it was the duty of the court
to inform him of his right in that regard. And finally, a defendant was con-
victed of exhibiting a deadly weapon 20 5 on October 21, 1939, and on that
day filed his motion for a new trial; but the court proceeded to sentence him
before the motion was overruled the following January 4, and because the
record did not show allocution the cause was remanded with directions to set
aside the judgment, hear the motion, then pass sentence and permit the
appeal. And, of course, the statute applies and allocution is mandatory when
a motion for a new trial is not filed within the extended time allowed by the
court.
2 8
Not only must the record show the formality of allocution "unless the
same is waived,' 2 0 7 but also the record must state the facts, and not the
conclusion, that allocution was accorded. 20 It is iot enough that the record
may indicate the cermony may have been performed defectively or imper-
fectly but the record must show that the court first informed the defendant
of the verdict of the jury and then asked him whether he had any legal
cause to show why sentence should not be pronounced against him, just as
the statute says.209 In 1905 a judgment which recited "The defendant being
now asked if he had any legal cause to show why sentence should not be
pronounced against him according to law, the defendant failing to show such
203 State v. Crow, 337 Mo. 397, 84 S. W. (2d) 926 (1935); State v. Mauzy,
79 S. W. (2d) 1044 (Mo., 1935).
204. State v. Madden, 324 Mo. 877, 24 S. W. (2d) 1003 (1930).
205. State v. Carrow, 147 S. W. (2d) 436 (Mo. 1941).
206. State v. Harrison, 29 S. W. (2d) 63 (Mo. 1930).
207. State v. Barr, 326 Mo. 1095, 1100, 34 S .W. (2d) 477, 479 (1930).
208. State v. Madole, 347 Mo. 575, 148 S. W. (2d) 793 (1941).
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cause.. . ." was approved.2 10 And an incorrect record, erroneously showing
sentence without allocution, was corrected in the supreme court by the state,
with leave of court, filing a duly certified transcript of the record showing
the defendant was sentenced in accordance with the requirements of the
statute,211 the court's former opinion remanding the cause was then with-
drawn, a rehearing granted on the court's own motion and the judgment
affirmed on the record proper, there being no bill of exceptions.
But, when a timely motion for a new trial is interposed prior to the
pronouncement of judgment and therefore heard, presumably, the statutory
necessity for allocution ceases to be mandatory and becomes directory
only,212 such circumstances bringing the case squarely within the directory,
which seems to mean discretionary, provisions of the statute.2 13 In such
cases, allocution being omitted, it is not necessary that the trial court set
the sentence aside and grant allocution because the motion for a new trial
is a showing of cause against pronouncing judgment.2 14 Or, when allocution
is accorded and the defendant fails to ask leave to file a motion for a new
trial, he must be deemed to have waived it.215
In misdemeanor convictions the statute is directory only, regardless of
the fact that the motion for a new trial is filed after judgment and only the
record proper is before the court for consideration. 216 In these cases the
court has held that when the appellant makes no objection to the court's
pronouncing judgment before the motion for new trial has been filed it can-
not be convicted of error in failing to grant allocution.217 And singularly
enough, it would seem, in a misdemeanor case certified to the supreme court
by the Springfield Court of Appeals, when the "... record proper does not
show that defendant was denied allocution, nor that he was sentenced before
he filed his motion for a new trial .... In the absence of evidence to the
210. State v. Williams, 191 Mo. 205, 214, 90 S. W. 448, 451 (1905).
211. State v. Potter, 278 S. W. 711 (Mo. 1926); Id. at 285 S. W. 424 (Mo.
1926).
212. State v. Padgett, 316 Mo. 179, 289 S. W. 954 (1926); State v. Pind, 55
S. W. (2d) 941 (Mo. 1932); State v. Ross, 334 Mo. 870, 69 S. W. (2d) 293 (1934).
213. State v. Darby, 165 S. W. (2d) 419 (Mo. 1942).
214. State v, Williams, 273 S. W. 1069 (Mo. 1925).
215. State v. Porter, 81 S. W. (2d) 316 (Mo. 1935); State v. Walker, 309
Mo. 103, 274 S. W. 56 (1925); State v. Pritchett, 219 Mo. 696, 119 S. W. 386 (1909).
216. State v. Clinkenbeard, 232 Mo. 539, 134 S. W. 537 (1911); State v. Tur-
ner, 273 S. W. 739 (Mo. 1925); State v. Baker, 274 S. W. 359 (Mo. 1925); State
v. Selleck, 46 S. W. (2d) 570 (Mo. 1932).
217. State v. Legan, 80 S. W. (2d) 122 (Mo. 1935).
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contrary, it will be presumed that the trial court did its duty in granting
allocution before the judgment was rendered."218 (Italics added.)
Our allocution statutes do not by their terms make the ceremony direc-
tory or discretionary when there is a plea of guilty; neither do they ex-
pressly require it, but because they say the court must inform the defendant
of the jury's verdict unless he has been heard on motion for a new trial the
court has held that they have no application in such cases and are required
only after the accused has been tried and found guilty by a jury.219 The
court stresses the fact, also, in such cases that there is no bill of exceptions
and the cases are invariably before the court on the record proper only.
There had never been a capital case in Missouri, on a plea of guilty, involv-
ing allocution until State v. Ashworth in 1940.220 In that case the defendant
pled guilty to the charge of kidnapping. Before he was sentenced the court
interrogated the defendant as to his prior criminal record which showed a
larceny conviction, rape upon a girl thirteen, and that in the instant case
he had ravished a child of seven. The court then sentenced the prisoner
to be executed. The case was in the supreme court on the record proper, of
course, and showed the appointment of counsel to defend the accused, ar-
raignment, his plea and the punishment, but it did not show allocution and
there was diversity of opinion among the members of the court as to whether
it was required on a plea of guilty. For that reason the whole subject of
allocution was again reviewed and the conclusion reaffirmed that the for-
mality was not required upon a plea of guilty. The defendant specifically
raised the point, urging that the court had failed to inquire into the facts
and ascertain if any legal reason existed against the pronouncement of sen-
tence and judgment. The court construed the statutes and came to the con-
clusion that they were intended to apply only when there had been a jury
trial. The common law of allocution and its applicability to present con-
ditions was discussed and it was noted that our statutes, enacted in 1879,
superceded the common law. It was observed that the statutes extended
allocution even to misdemeanors but made the requirement directory only
in such instances. "As a sentence on a plea of guilty is not within the stat-
ute, it follows that allocution was not required in the case at bar."
In conclusion, as to Missouri, it is plain that as long as the statutes
218. State v. Dalton, 289 S. W. 569, 570 (Mo., 1926).
219. State v. Rogers, 285 S. W. 976 (Mo., 1926); State v. Borchert, 312 Mo.
447, 279 S. W. 72 (1926).
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remain in force, allocution is mandatory in the instances specifically within
their provisions. Those obligatory instances and the purposes'to which the
statutory ceremony is now put are a far cry from the common law usage
from which the practice came and as contrasted with present day practice
and procedure elsewhere. They are peculiar to Missouri. It is an absurdity
that a defendant's rights, and especially his right to a review of his convic-
tion, should be made to depend upon and turn on whether his motion for a
new trial was filed before judgment, as the new trial statute in criminal
cases requires, and not after. In a criminal case the judgment is the sentence
-it is the formal declaration by the court to the accused of the legal con-
sequences of his guilt which he has confessed or of which he has been con-
victed221 and it is of this final declaration that he is aggrieved and desires
relief. Furthermore, appeals are allowed only by statute from this final
declaration or judgment.222
Missouri's judicial interpretation of its allocution statutes is unique.
That compliance with the statutes is mandatory when the defendant has
been tried and not heard on motion for new trial cannot be denied, but to
hold that the statutes compel the setting aside of the judgment and a re-
manding of the cause for allocution and in addition a hearing on the motion
for a new trial and then an appeal, using the untimely motion to preserve
errors, is to read something into the statutes that is not there. In the first
place, the statutes do not say what the consequence of omitting the cere-
mony is to be nor for that matter even expressly declare the purpose of re-
quiring it. In the second place, if on appeal the defendant complains that
the clerk, the court or the circumstances unjustly deprived him of his right
to file a timely motion for new trial and either of these is the fact, is not
that in and of itself enough to entitle the defendant to relief? If none of
these are true, is not the duty on the appellant to show that he has been
prejudicially injured in some way? Is not the duty his to see to it that a
correct and proper record is presented? If not, is it necessary to tie such
objections up with the doctrine of allocution as a prerequisite to admin-
istering justice? Such circumstances, being unjustly or improperly prevented
from filing a motion for -new trial, have been held to be good and sufficient
reasons or grounds for granting relief and tlat without reference to allocu-
tion. To illustrate, after a five day trial for rape a jury returned a capital
221. State v. Kellar, 332 Mo. 62, 55 S. W. (2d) 969 (1932); 24 C. J. S., CRIMI-
NAL LAW § 1556.
222. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 4130.
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verdict at 11:45 of the last day of the term. Obviously the remaining fifteen
minutes was not sufficient time in which to prepare and file a motion for a
new trial and to prevent such an injustice the cause was remanded, the court
pointing out that any other course would deprive the accused of his liberty
and his life, even, without due process of law. 223 Would the court have ar-
rived at the same conclusion if in the fifteen minutes the ceremony of allocu-
tion had been performed? Allocution was not even mentioned. It is stated
in the Taylor case that the defendant had not bad time to prepare a motion
for new trial and in the Turpin case the record shows verdict, sentence and
judgment all in one proceeding without an opportunity for allocution or a
motion of any kind before judgment. If it is of that the prisoner complains
should he not be entitled to relief regardless of allocution? Had it been
accorded would he have been aided if at the same time he had been denied
the privilege of filing his motion? In State v. West, the defendant was de-
prived of his right to file his motion for a new trial by the illegal act of the
clerk. Had the record affirmatively shown allocution before judgment would
the court have refused him relief?
Even if these suggestions are not well founded it is not possible to find
from the forty-four cases in Missouri involving allocution that the result in
a single case was ever changed or modified in the slightest by reason of its
having been remanded for this purpose, even under the view that the judg-
ment is set aside when the defendant is deprived of his right to move for a
new trial. In only two instances did the remanded cases ever reappear in
the appellate court and in one of those, State v. Potter, the record was cor-
rected and the former opinion withdrawn, and in the other case Kile's appeal
was dismissed and the judgment against him remained.
* If the motion for a new trial must be filed before judgment there should
be a provision against the pronouncement or entry of judgment during the
time in which the motion is to be filed, as is now provided in many juris-
dictions. In any event it should not be necessary to observe this ancient
ceremony wiih its dubious benefits and the judicial metaphysics interpolated
into it in order to properly administer criminal justice and particularly ap-
pellate criminal justice. In one sentence Dean Pound has gone to the root
of the matter and summarized what should be the present day attitude
toward criminal appellate review: "If one looked at the matter with no
knowledge of its history and as something to be established de ovo on the
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basis of modern conceptions of social control, it would seem that where life or
liberty is at stake, as in a criminal prosecution, a rational re-examination
of the whole case after trial, at least at the instance of a convicted accused,
to be made by a tribunal insuring the best judicial power in the jurisdiction,
in order to insure that justice has been done, would be a matter of course.' 1221 a
The only justification for devoting time, space and energy to a consid-
eration of the subject of allocution and its necessarily limited, boresome and
repetitious vocabulary is that it again demonstrates the need for change in
the administration of criminal justice and particularly of the process of ap-
pellate criminal procedure. That the individual's rights or the state's ad-
ministration of justice should turn and depend upon the observance or non-
observance of so ancient and futile a ceremony as allocution is absurd indeed.
As an alternative for appellate procedure and the process leading up to
appellate review the first preliminary draft of the FEDERAL RULES OF CRIM-
INAL PROCEDURE are suggested for Missouri and elsewhere, particularly Rule
48:22ab
"(a) Harmless Error. Any error, defect, irregularity, or vari-
ance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded.
(b) Plain Error. Plain error or defects affecting substantial
rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the at-
tention of the court."
The most zealous advocate of defendant's rights in criminal causes could
not object to such a provision. That one man should have a new or another
trial because his more skillful advocate specifically pointed out plain error ih
a motion for a new trial, while another must serve his sentence, without ap-
pellate review, merely because his not so clever counsel did not use the magic
phrases is an indefensible incongruity in the administration of justice and
inconsistent with even a sporting theory of justice. Such a change might
necessitate a considerable educational program as to what should and what
should not reasonably be presented for appellate review, but, nevertheless, is
more likely to bring about efficiency and equality in the administration of
criminal jurisprudence without legerdemain. It is the cause or case itself
and not the record that is entitled to review.223C
223a. Pound, Introduction to ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA. (1939) 3.
223b. This appears as Rule 55 in the Second Preliminary Draft, which does
not materially differ.
22 3c. Id. at 9; ORFIELD, CRIMINAL APPEALS IN AMERICA 274-275, 288, 295-
296; Orfield, The Scope Of Appeal In Ctiminal Cases 84 U. OF PA. L. REv. 825.
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Today, as always, allocution is an authoritative address by the court to
the prisoner as he stands at the bar for sentence. It is no longer so hortatory
and interesting as it once was because it has been reduced to the trite for-
mula and query of whether the prisoner has any cause to show why sentence
or judgment should not be pronounced against him. As a subject it is not
worthy of the hundreds of pages.the courts have devoted to it. Its intrinsic
value and importance is out of proportion to the time necessary to consider
the subject and its origin.214
All the common law reasons or uses for allocution have long since dis-
appeared. Missouri is illustrative of the fact in all the jurisdictions. Both
the constitution and the statutes have abolished attainder, corruption of
blood and forfeiture of estates as a consequence of conviction of a felony
or even conviction of treason.22 The power to grant pardons, or reprieves,
or to commute sentences has been conferred on the chief executive by the
constitution22' and these matters have no connection whatever with the
judiciary or the judicial process. Benefit of clergy has been abolished by
statute.227 Specific statutory provision is made for the suspension of the
sentence of a condemned pregnant woman.228 Motions in arrest of judgment
have been abolished 28 and the insanity of an accused, either before or after
conviction, may be inquired into in the manner provided by statute.280
There may be more semblance of reason for the requirement of allocu-
tion in the jurisdictions adopting the American Law Institute type statutes
and yet the causes which those statutes permit to be alleged against the
rendition of judgment could and doubtless would be otherwise provided for
and that regardless of and without the sacrament of allocution. It is sub-
mitted that if the formula is to be observed there is -more reason and justi-
fication for compelling it upon a plea of guilty-especially in a capital case-
than there is after a jury trial; otherwise, there can be no assurance that the
trial court went into the mitigating and aggravating circumstances before
assessing so severe and irrevocable a penalty as death.
224. As a friend and better at the law practice so eloquently put it "Who
gives a damn?"
225. Mo. CONsT. ART. II, § 13; Mo. REv. STAT. § 4858.
226. Mo. CoNsT. ART. V, § 8.
227. Mo. REv. STAT. (1939) § 4859.
228. Id. at § 4196.
229. Id. at § 4126.
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It is not demonstrable that anyone was ever substantially benefited
by compelling the observance of the ceremony of allocution except those who
received additional fees or compensation by reason of the prisoner's being
resentenced and excepting always, of course, those three extremely lucky
individuals, one in Alabama and two in New York, who were fortunate
enough to have been granted new trials for the sole reason that the trial
courts had failed to observe this ancient and obscure ritual. In no event
should the omission of this hoary ceremony be considered as error, plain or
harmless, unless it is complained of by the prisoner and prejudice to sub-
stantial rights is demonstrated. If the appellant's only complaint is of the
judge's failure to inquire whether he had any reason why sentence should
not be imposed, he is indeed clinging to a plank in a shipwreck, "tabula in
naufragio." As the Wisconsin court bluntly put it: "It is time the law be
rid of this technicality, which rests only in tradition and is barren of any
substantial benefit to the defendant."
"It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so
it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule
simply persists from blind imitation of the past,"23' said Mr. Justice Holmes.
231. Holmes, The Path Of The Law (1897) 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469.
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